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**The American University in Cairo**

**School of Global Affairs and Public Policy**

**STATE FRAGILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN  
EGYPT**

**A Thesis Submitted to the**

**Public Policy and Administration Department**

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Public Policy**

**By**

**Mahmoud Mukhtar Mukhtar Ahmed Elmakkawe**

**Spring 2021**

## **Dedication**

*To the heroes of Egypt who valiantly dared to defy the odds in October 1973 and  
January 2011*

### **Epigraph**

“Experience shows that when political governance and economic management diverge, overall development becomes unsustainable.” ~ Mo Ibrahim, October 4, 2010

The American University in Cairo  
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy  
Department of Public Policy and Administration

STATE FRAGILITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN EGYPT

Mahmoud Mukhtar Mukhtar Ahmed Elmakkawe

Supervised by Associate Professor Hamid Ali

**Abstract**

This study discusses the problem of state fragility in Egypt and its relationship with sustainable development goals from 2006 to 2016 through utilizing data from relevant literature and reports. Qualitatively analyzing the indicators of the two main variables: fragility and sustainable development goals, the study concludes that Egypt remains politically fragile despite various relative advancements on sustainable development goals recorded. While some progress has been made on multiple socioeconomic indicators throughout the period specified, Egypt still shows an alarming level of fragility, particularly, when it comes to political aspects of democratic governance that include security, justice, rule of law, and human rights.

**Keywords:** State Fragility; Sustainable Development Goals; Egypt; Governance

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

State building has been a matter of academic research ever since the 1960s with the shift from state building to state fragility gaining momentum after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 (Baranyi & Desrosiers, 2012). In the same regard, the 9/11 attacks in 2001 were seen as major turning points in directing the focus towards fragile states (Menkhaus, 2010). Studying state fragility has ever since become increasingly important in terms of addressing several global challenges including terrorism, poverty, violence, and migration (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018).

Scholarly attention directed towards the phenomenon of state fragility is becoming more critical for a better understanding of its nature and implications. Brinkerhoff (2016) argues that state fragility is the inability of a country to perform its basic tasks represented in providing social services to citizens. Moreover, both Maier (2010) and OECD (2008) argue states become fragile when they no longer have either the capability or willingness to protect the rights of their people. In addition to failing to provide adequate services to citizens, the political aspect of having capable and functioning state institutions is crucial in the process of framing the concept of fragility (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). In terms of comprehending the notion of state fragility, Balthasar (2019), stresses the importance of political will in performing governance tasks. In the same regard, Brinkerhoff (2016) emphasizes the crucial need for evaluating the political aspect of fragility. Understanding how institutions function may pose solutions that tackle state weaknesses and enhance overall resilience (Iyad, 2019).

Academic debates focused on either dealing with fragility in conflict-torn societies or assessing the role of foreign aid during the fragility. However, reversing forces of state fragility in developing countries is still under-researched (Fishere, 2017). Similarly, Mcloughlin, (2012) highlights the role of political, institutional and structural aspects in the course of addressing

fragility more than conflict or external factors. Fragility constitutes a political syndrome that deeply impacts the society in one of two forms; the first is related to a state lacking the needed power to ensure security over its territories, while the second is due to a state's abuse of power already existing (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). Brinkerhoff (2016) argues that fragility can happen due to a set of factors that includes plenty of resources, lack of political will to collectively rule on good governance basis, dominance of elite groups, patrimonialism, dominance of patronage, as well as corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking. Ferreira (2017) refers to the usual problem of confusing fragility symptoms with causes, justifying this by the lack of solid theoretical foundations that frame the concept of fragility. However, Besley & Persson (2011) stress that chief symptoms of fragility would, typically, revolve around state ineffectiveness, political violence and absence of cohesive institutional frameworks through which common interests can be expressed and preserved. Fragility is also related to restricting freedoms and directly proportional to the increase in the number of uprisings in a given society (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2012).

Fragility is, then, seen as an aspect of governance malfunctioning; it represents a political challenge that states need to address in order to boost their regimes' legitimacy and stability and advance into more inclusive and effective government (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). Understanding fragility as a governance-related phenomenon, therefore, allows us to better tackle its structural dimensions.

Governance is defined as "a set of processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that leads to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions" (Islam, 2017). Moreover, it is about functioning institutions that enable the implementation of sustainable development plans with SDG16 indicating that "effective governance institutions and systems that are responsive to public needs deliver essential services and promote inclusive growth" (Iyad, 2019). It also implies the



ability to reach socioeconomic goals in a society, which is why, sometimes, it is considered difficult to attain in developing countries (Peters, 2019). In the same context, Alence (2004), demonstrates that governance improves when there is political contestation in a democratic framework with well-established institutional ground rules. On the other side, weak institutions, both formal and informal, contribute to fragility, as more citizens, civil society actors, private sector representatives together with governmental entities tend to refrain from following public and transparent rules and regulations (Anten, 2009). Inclusive governance is, therefore, viewed as a precondition for addressing fragility (Carothers, 2016).

On the relationship between governance, fragility and sustainable development, argues Khan (2012) that countries that managed to make remarkable progress in areas of development used to have effective governance structures, but none of which enjoyed good governance when they first embarked on their developmental transition. Conversely, Iyad (2019) explains that the institutional dimension of governance is a prerequisite for the success of sustainable development. Nussbaum, Zorbas & Koros (2012) highlight the role of building effective institutional frameworks in order to guarantee a sustainable development. Good governance and development are, therefore, seen as two sides of the same coin, strengthening and impacting one another (UNDP, 2006). While weak governance leads to malforming growth process, which, in turn, accelerates fragility (Zoellick, 2008), investment in sustainable development is hugely needed in the course of tackling state fragility (Global Agenda Councils, 2014). Although the Fragile States Index, chiefly used in this study, has multiple indicators for measuring fragility, it is important to highlight that the author would examine only the political ones which measure State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites.

This study aims to explore the impact of attaining Sustainable Development Goals on state fragility, taking Egypt as a case study. The United Nations 2030 Agenda includes a set of

17 Sustainable Development Goals, also known as SDGs, for countries to pursue with 169 specific targets in different areas of social, economic, environmental and human development; these SDGs are:

No.	Goal	Explanation
1	No Poverty	End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
2	Zero Hunger	End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
3	Good Health and Well-Being	Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
4	Quality Education	Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
5	Gender Equality	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
6	Clean Water and Sanitation	Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.
7	Affordable and Clean Energy	Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
8	Decent Work and Economic Growth	Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
9	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.
10	Reduced Inequalities	Reduce inequality within and among countries.
11	Sustainable Cities and Communities	Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
12	Responsible Consumption and Production	Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
13	Climate Action	Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
14	Life below Water	Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
15	Life on Land	Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

16	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
17	Partnerships for the Goals	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

Applying the concepts of governance and fragility in the Egyptian context, the country is politically categorized at the high warning level of fragility (Fund for Peace, 2019). Furthermore, the state institutions are labeled decayed (Ali, 2018) with political defragmentation and the close of the civil society, among other aspects of autocracy, deepening its fragility and weakness (Carothers, 2016). In this regard, it is important to note that the Middle East, as a whole, has long been a center for institutional fragility, where most countries, Egypt included, failed to face their governance challenges, due to the nature of their repressive regimes, which, instead of adopting political reform and utilizing knowledge and technological progress, rely on huge incompetent bureaucratic bodies to meet the ever increasing needs of their youth-dominant populations, usually, at a substandard level of quality (Ali, 2018). Incapable of ensuring prosperity to its people, Egypt is known to be one of the great developmental aid receivers, despite being non-democratic (Eka-Ikpe, 2007). Even recently, Egypt is the 8th recipient of foreign aid of the first 20 countries (OECD, 2016), a clear mark of how the state is still struggling with providing services to its citizens. Baker (2014) argues that the country showed several signs of decay, including low political legitimacy, growing social grievances and poor economic performance. In addition, Ragab (2017) stresses that limited capacity of state institutions in Egypt makes the process of meeting the economic and security demands of the people more challenging, which weakens the state's overall resilience defined as "a process of reform through which the state and society are more capable of overcoming political, social, economic and security crises without threatening social stability or weakening political legitimacy". Kaplan (2015) highlights that despite using violence and

military force against other sectors of the society, Egypt still enjoys a good-standing sense of nationhood which acts as a strong centripetal force against decomposition.

Since part of the definition of fragility deals with the issue of state provision of social services (Education, health, social protection, and so forth), examining Egypt's realization of the SDGs becomes necessary for better exploring to what extent the state is fulfilling its basic social duties towards its people. The World Bank Group (2018) demonstrates that Egypt has made a significant progress on 9 of the 17 SDGs, many of which are related to public services provided to citizens, despite the post 2008 disruptions. The 2017 Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace concludes that Egypt's state of fragility, throughout the decade (2007-2017) is marginally worsening compared to other fragile countries in the Arab World.

Using a case study, the author follows a qualitative approach to answer the research question: What is the impact of SDGs on state fragility in Egypt? In this case study, it might be asserted that some of the SDGs are reducing state fragility, while others might have marginal impact as state resources were constrained, in addition to the competing alternatives to allocate resources between fulfilling society needs versus feeding the inefficient bureaucratic state machine.

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 addresses the literature review. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework, alongside the methodology. Chapter 4 includes the discussion and data analysis while Chapter 5 presents the conclusion and recommendations.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

State fragility acts as a combination of compound structural causes and effects (Menkhaus, 2010). It is more of a multi-dimensional syndrome that needs homegrown tailored interventions rather than one size fits all external solutions (Kaplan, 2016). Defining state fragility is yet a conceptual challenge, since most of the attempts to do so lack the needed theoretical foundations, resulting in conceptual confusion (Ferreira, 2017). Placing the focus

on the methods of measuring and operationalizing the term, however, is becoming increasingly necessary, both academically and politically (OECD, 2016). Fragility represents a country's inability to perform its basic tasks, or assume its responsibilities towards its citizens, in terms of providing basic social services (Brinkerhoff, 2016); it expresses a state's inability to perform its governance functions either because of lack of capacity or political will (Balthasar, 2019); it is also defined as the lack of capacity to maintain security, guarantee human rights, generate jobs or provide opportunities, alongside the presence of a dysfunctional private sector in a socio-politically divided society (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018).

Zoellick (2008) views fragility as a failure in the normal growth process of a state in which poverty becomes persistent condition combined with waned governance, corruption and insecurity. While Besley & Persson (2011) highlight state ineffectiveness and political violence as major symptoms of state fragility, McLoughlin (2012) argues that fragility, as a notion, has multiple aspects, political (lack of legitimacy, crisis of authority, repression of opposition, weak formal institutions, institutional multiplicity, political transition, succession and reform crises in authoritarian states, etc.), economic (poverty, low incomes, economic decline, violent conflict, armed insurgency, natural resource wealth/lack of natural resource wealth, geography, demographic stress of urbanization), and social (horizontal inequalities, severe identity fragmentation, social exclusion, gender inequality, lack of social cohesion and capital weak civil society) (p.16). It is quite useful here to stress that the political aspect of fragility is the one to be examined in this study.

Fragile states are a difficult challenge to address, for they undergo a group of severe crises at a time, including low standards of human development, ailing infrastructure, political defragmentation and social tension brought about by the failure to address socioeconomic challenges and meet popular demands for social well-being and economic growth (Giovannetti,

et al., 2009). Moreover, the absence of capable institutions, well-founded norms and regulatory frameworks that can peacefully manage sociopolitical conflict and address class tension makes the process of reversing fragility quite operationally challenging (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). Political settlements, corruption, alongside maintaining power and control through authoritarian relations with citizens create states with fundamental weakness and deepen fragility (Brinkerhoff, 2016). Additionally, attempts to strike a balance between fulfilling short term demands and investing in long term political reforms are usually too difficult to succeed in fragile states (Giovannetti, et al., 2009).

Politically, leaders of fragile states are seen less legitimate in the eyes of their electoral bodies, when they no longer perform their duties or fulfill the social contract upon which they were elected either because of lack of capacity, authority or will (Maier, 2010; OECD, 2008). However technical it seems (being related to public service provision), fragility is a political challenge that indicates a deep governance malfunction (OECD, 2008).

Fragility is, therefore, linked to governance; which is understood as the presence of effective contractual and administrative relationship between both the state and the individual that not only prevents the state from deviation and corruption but also enables it to perform well (LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). While fragility has to do with the inability to provide basic services, the availability and quality of social services, such as primary education and health care, are vital measurements of governance (OECD, 2008). State fragility, consequently, is believed to have strong links with the concepts of governance and socioeconomic development (Maier, 2010). Improving governance in fragile states is crucial for global security and prosperity (Kaplan, 2015; Hughes, B. et al., 2014).

Comprehensively, governance relates to the process of interaction amongst sociopolitical players in an institutional framework or setting with a unified and commonly

agreed upon set of rules and regulations (Islam, 2017). The institutional part of the definition of governance is, therefore, important for providing a suitable environment for sustainable development to flourish (Iyad, 2019). It is clear that, in this regard, functioning institutions are seen as a necessary pretext for both good governance and sustainable development, which is quite compatible with SDG 16. Iyad (2019) also argues that governance is related to creating systems that enable the provision of public services and ensure economic growth. Peters (2019) agrees that governance is about building the technical capacity needed to attain social and economic targets. Governance and development are, therefore seen, as complementary and strongly correlated (UNDP, 2006), and good governance, in turn, is regarded as a prerequisite for sustainable development to be fruitful (Ware, 2014; Corral, P. et al., 2020).

Contrary to the previous, argues Lane (2019) that institutions are not the core of governance and that achieving considerable accumulation of economic growth, is what constitutes a strong base for good governance unlike what is commonly perceived by international organizations. In the same line of thought, Anten (2009) demonstrates that the attention paid to governance quality is justifiable, yet, a minimum level of economic growth is needed as a prerequisite; He, further explains that governance institutions are not exclusive to states but used to exist way before the modern concept of statehood evolved. On a related note, Khan (2012) contends that governance may not be the one crucial element in improving economic growth and developmental efforts and that many of the countries that have achieved remarkable developmental progress over the past century did not necessarily enjoy effective/democratic governance structures in their early beginnings.

In the context of developing countries, explains Peters (2019) that developing states might not be fully fit for good governance, and that gradual and minor reforms are preferred; he also distinguishes between centralized governance and flexible governance, indicating that each impacts the form a state takes. Khan (2017) contends that post-colonial states path, either

to more fragility or higher resilience, will be determined by their choice of their political governance system. Khan (2012) argues that developing countries usually score badly on every dimension of good governance for it requires huge capabilities that are difficult to attain, and that developmental governance, instead, is more needed to invest in for practical and economic reasons. It is important here to note that development-oriented governance requires the ability to geographically operate on multiple fronts (Corral, P. et al., 2020).

For governance to improve, there should be a democratic setting, in which the executive power is institutionally restrained (Allence, 2004). Furthermore, an open and active civil society is a decisive factor in ensuring that a country has a system of inclusive governance based on balanced state-society relations that allow public participation in decision and policymaking (Carothers, 2016).

While reforms of governance need to be prioritized for more successful development, it is also important to be aware of the diverse and different governance arrangements experienced by countries like Chile, China, and Vietnam (Department for International Development, 2005). Therefore, being context-based and paying attention to the circumstantial differences among fragile states are becoming scholarly priorities in order to understand and address the phenomenon of state fragility (OECD, 2011).

In the context of addressing the relationship between fragility, as a governance-related notion and development, Islam (2017) explains that development is a process that enables human beings to unleash their potential, live with dignity and feel confident and satisfied, away from being vulnerable to suppression, need, or fear. It is important, in this regard, to note that all SDGs revolve around these values. Taking Egypt, as an example, it is clear that the government is paying attention to the concept of sustainable development through adopting a set of measures. According to the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform (2018), specialized units and working groups have been established across all ministries to



push for further adoption of sustainable development in government; these groups are also tasked with enhancing intergovernmental communication on matters of sustainable development, not to mention the official issuing of the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), known as Egypt Vision 2030 in 2016 which acts as a roadmap to coordinate all state efforts in areas of sustainable development. Furthermore, the government has provided two National Voluntary Reviews in 2016 and 2018 reporting on its performance in terms of implementing the SDGs. Despite signaling relatively opposing tendencies to both fragility and resilience (Baker, 2014), the World Bank Group (2018) states that Egypt is performing better than expected in terms of 9 SDGs (SDG 1, SDG 3, SDG 6, SDG 7, SDG 9, SDG 10, SDG 11, and SDG 14), with sustained developmental gains all over the past years in spite of the post 2008 turmoil era, while remarkably underperforming in regards to 5 SDGs (SDG 2, SDG 4, SDG 8, SDG 12, and SDG 17), ones that are of great importance for achieving the 2030 agenda. In terms of SDG 16, one that is most relevant to governance in the political sense, El-Baradei (2020) concludes that there has been a lack of proper governmental reporting on what has been achieved with respect to this politically critical goal, referring to the usual dilemma of the absence of reliable data in the context of non-democratic developing countries.

### Study Significance

This study aims to assess Egypt's several attempts to achieve socioeconomic development under several political regimes and administrations. It attempts to examine whether development alone is enough to address the country's governance crisis. The study seeks to offer a clearer understanding of the relationship between tackling state fragility, as a governance concept, and the realization of sustainable development goals through examining Egypt's performance across sustainable development indicators in a 10-year period. In doing so, it compares this performance with the country's fragility scores throughout the same period

so as to explore whether achieving high rates of sustainable development is sufficient to enhance a country's resilience and reduce its vulnerability to weakness and institutional fragility. In this regard, Egypt's performance across the sustainable development indicators acts as the independent variable while Egypt's performance across the fragility index will act as the dependent variable. The study focuses on Egypt between 2006 and 2016, a period that witnessed multiple political, economic, and sociodemographic developments in Egypt, such as the 2008 Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tahrir Uprising, the 2013 Military Intervention, the 2014 Presidential Elections, and finally the 2016 Currency Devaluation. Relying on secondary sources, such as international reports, research papers, policy documents and publications, this study provides an interpretive analysis of the literature on fragility using a qualitative approach by selecting Egypt as a case study through touching upon several areas of state building, development, and governance.

#### Problem Statement

Egypt has long been known for its malfunctioning bureaucracy, and weak institutions. It, therefore, suffers from a decreasing capability of providing services to citizens and fulfilling their developmental demands through an open process of dialogue and agenda setting with the participation of civil society (Carothers, 2016; Fishere, 2017). Political repression in Egypt worsens its situation and accelerates its decay (Ali, 2018). Moreover, the country does not seem to radically tackle its structural governance problems even with the great amount of developmental aid it receives (OECD, 2016). In 2019, Egypt was in the high warning section on the State Fragility Index, which shows how severely, the country is suffering from structural weaknesses (Fund for Peace, 2019). Not paying attention to resolving state fragility in Egypt hinders the process of building constructive state-society relations and establishing enlightened governance, which risks decreasing state responsiveness and increasing potentials for radicalization and defragmentation (Carothers, 2016). In the process of tackling the ever-

increasing socioeconomic needs of its citizens and improving governmental performance and the quality of public services, the Government of Egypt incorporates the concept of sustainable development within each and every project, entity and initiative it carries out (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). It also issued its Sustainable Development Document, known as Egypt Vision 2030, aligning its plans with the 17 SDGs.

Therefore, this study attempts to offer a qualitative evaluation of the impact of Sustainable Development Goals on state fragility in Egypt through examining the data generated by the Fragile States Index, along with the SDGs indicators during the decade (2006-2016).

#### Problem Significance

State fragility is the main driver of conflict, terrorism, migration and poverty in many parts of today's world (Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). It leads to institutional ineffectiveness and political violence (Ferreira, 2015). State fragility is accompanied by closing of civil society space, which increases societal exclusion and worsens political dichotomy and polarization (Carothers, 2016). It is also connected with the rise in factionalism, the deterioration of economic performance, the delegitimization of state foundations and the probability of insurgency and external intervention (Menkhaus, 2010). It also results in a defragmentation of the social contract, and damage of state-society relations, decreasing their formality and making them less institutionalized (OECD, 2008).

Fragility is believed to have strong links with the spread of crime, hunger, malnutrition and disease (Hoeffler, 2019). Fragile states usually suffer from low human development, and insufficient foreign direct investments, alongside a persistent inability to mobilize domestic resources (Giovannetti, Et al., 2009). It is estimated that 1.5 billion people are living in countries characterized by continuous fragility and weakness (Global Agenda Councils, 2014).

### Research Question

To what extent does achieving sustainable development goals impact the political aspect of state fragility in Egypt?

### Research Objective

The study aims to reach a better estimation of the extent to which governance is impacted by developmental efforts in Egypt; it addresses state fragility as a governance problem that has links with development, exploring whether there is a correlation of any kind between the implementation sustainable development goals and achieving a higher degree of state resilience and institutional effectiveness.

### Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Methodology

State fragility has links with a country's ability to provide suitable conditions for sustainable economic growth, fulfilling people's basic needs, and maintaining strong, transparent and accountable institutions (Ferreira, 2017) – which are all parts of the SDGs. Moreover, eradicating poverty – which happens to be the first of SDGs – and improving economic growth are strongly connected with tackling state fragility (Hoeffler, 2019). Nussbaum, Zorbas & Koros (2012) also stress the connection between sustainable development and state building and institutions – one of the fragility indicators- in the context of engaging in fragile states. According to the World Development Report, investment in sustainable development is crucial for the process of addressing state fragility (Global Agenda Councils, 2014). Consequently, this study aims to explore the relationship between two main concepts: Sustainable Development Goals and State Fragility, where state fragility relates to governance, as a political notion. The framework can, therefore, be as follows:

Sustainable Development Goals → Better Governance → Less State Fragility

The conceptual relationship, to be tested throughout the examining the literature, alongside the related reports and documents, revolves around the diagram above, in which Sustainable Development Goals, measured by the UN indicators, are the independent variable, whereas State Fragility, measured by the Fragile States Index, represents the dependent variable. The data used in this study for the time period between 2006 and 2016 is used to answer the question of whether there is a significant correlation between Egypt's performance across the United Nations Sustainable Development Indicators and the Fragile States Index by the Fund for Peace. Although the SDGs were officially developed in 2015, the overall concept of sustainable development was first mentioned in the Brundtland Report issued by the World Commission on Environment and Development, more than 30 years ago United Nations (1987). In light of this concept, the study uses the indicators of the SDGs as a roadmap/parameter in order to track and qualitatively assess Egypt's developmental efforts throughout the pre 2016 period.

This study uses literature review and secondary sources of data as a research method in order to qualitatively and critically examine whether Egypt's scores across sustainable development indicators were proportional, whether directly, inversely or neutrally, to its scores on the State Fragility Index during the period between 2006 till 2016 to understand the impact of the pursuit of sustainable development goals on state fragility in Egypt.

#### Chapter 4: Discussion and Data Analysis


This study relies on conducting an interpretive analysis of the scores that Egypt has achieved throughout the 10 years, between 2006 and 2016. Due to data availability, the author could not examine further beyond 2016 as many of the indicators' time-series data are not up to date nor cover the time period specified in the study either because of absence of data or lack of reliable reporting.

Two main sources were mainly used in this study: United Nations Statistics Hub and Fund for Peace. The first provides data on countries' performance – Egypt included – with regards to the 17 SDGs and their 231 indicators. Since not all the indicators cover the time period between 2006 and 2010, only 125 indicators are used in this study. The second produces the Fragile States Index that depends on integrating quantitative analysis, alongside qualitative research and content analysis in order to yield concrete assessments of states' fragility. On this index, countries' ranks are categorized by score quartiles: alert (90–120), warning (60–90), stable (30–60), and sustainable (0–30) (Ferreira, 2017). The Fragile States Index uses Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) where for each sub-indicator a myriad of search keywords is incorporated to media data in order to specify the saliency degree of these sub-indicators in regards to each state listed on the index (Fund for Peace, 2019). The index works as follows: the higher the score, the worse the country's performance and vice versa. The Fragile States Index includes 4 sets of indicators: Cohesion, Political, Economic, and Social, in which each is entitled to measure 3 specific aspects. For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120. In this regard, it is important to note that only the cohesion indicators, as well as the political ones will be used in this study. The cohesion indicators consist of 3 indicators; the first is concerned with Security Apparatus, the second measures Factionalized Groups, and the third measures Group Grievance. Similarly, the political indicators are composed of 3 indicators; the first measures State Legitimacy, the second focuses on Public Services, whereas the third is concerned with Human Rights and Rule of Law. Based on literature, these indices are firmly related to the political aspect of fragility; to start with, state's (in)ability to deliver security is at heart of the concept of state fragility (Maier, 2010). Moreover, security has been one of the problems posed by fragile states ever since 9/11 attacks (Menkhaus, 2010). Security is seen as a source and a


characteristic of fragility (Kaplan, 2016 & LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, 2018). Hence, the choice of the Security Apparatus index in this study. As for the Factionalized Groups, the index measures "power struggles, political competition, political transitions, credibility of electoral processes, perceived legitimacy of the ruling class". (Fund for Peace, 2019). Speaking of Group Grievances, the indicator focuses on "schisms between different groups in society and inclusion in the political process" (Fund for Peace, 2019). In the same regard, the State Legitimacy Indicator considers "the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry through looking at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes". As for the Public Services and the Human Rights and Rule of Law indices, they simply target the core definition of fragility being a technical phenomenon that has to do with service delivery to citizens as explained earlier in the literature review, and also as a political problem that touches upon liberties and law enforcement mechanisms including "harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, and repression of political opponents" (Fund for Peace, 2019).

## 1. Sustainable Development Indicators


### - SDG1: No Poverty (*End poverty in all its forms everywhere*)




**Fig 1.1:** Proportion of population below the international poverty line




**Fig 1.2:** Portion of employed population below the international poverty line




**Fig 1.3:** Proportion of population living below the national poverty line



**Fig 1.4:** Proportion of population using basic drinking water services.



**Fig 1.5:** Proportion of population using basic sanitation services



**Fig 1.6:** Direct agriculture loss attributed to disasters.



**Fig 1.7:** Direct economic loss resulting from damaged/destroyed infrastructure attributed to disasters


Source: <https://countryprofiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-1>

In Figure 1.1, while there is no specific data available for the year 2006, Egypt is seen here to have exerted fruitful efforts that brought down the percentage of its extreme poor population from 4% in 2008 to 1% in 2012, the years 2013 and 2014 do not seem to be represented with data with the curve even going up again starting 2015 with the problem of poverty still unresolved. Figure 1.2 shows that the overall trend is decreasing starting 2006 (which is not marked by a specific percent). In 2008, the percentage of workers and their families living on less than 1.90 US dollars per person per day was 2.9%. It went down gradually until it reached 0.5% in 2015. In Figure 1.3, the percentage of people living in poverty has been steadily on the rise starting 2006. In 2008, it was 21.6% reaching a limit of 27.8% of



the total population of Egypt, one that accounts for more than a quarter, if not approaching a third of the country's citizens. Figure 1.4 shows a positive improvement throughout the years in terms of the overall number of citizens with access to clean drinking water in Egypt with the percentage in 2006 being 98.3% of the whole population reaching 99% in 2016, i.e., an improvement of 0.7% in 10 years. In Figure 1.5, a positive growth is seen in the number of people using basic sanitation services with the overall percentage increasing from 92.9% in 2006 to 94% in 2016, i.e., 1.1% increase in a decade. Figure 1.6 reflects a slight increase in the disaster-related agricultural loss that continued from 2006 (14.3 million USD) to 2008 (15 million USD). However, the curve started to go down a little bit from 2008 until it reached 13.7 million USD in 2012. The magnitude of decrease started to accelerate until it reached an amount of 8.4 million USD in 2016, i.e., the country's direct losses was reduced by 5.9 million USD (nearly 41.3%) in 10 years' time. Figure 1.7 provides data only available starting 2010 which shows a kind of fluctuation in the yearly values of losses; the losses seem to go down in 2011 then increase in 2012 with a sudden drop in 2013 only to increase once again until they reach a high of 25.1 million USD before it falls to 1.3 million USD in 2016. The highest level of losses recorded is 28.6 million USD and it took place in 2010, the first year of reporting.


**- SDG2: Zero Hunger** (*End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture*)




**Fig 2.1:** Prevalence of undernourishment



**Fig 2.2:** Number of undernourished people




**Fig 2.3:** Proportion of children moderately or severely stunted




**Fig 2.4:** Children moderately or severely stunted in thousands

Source: <https://countryprofiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-2>


Figure 2.1 shows the proportion of population suffering from hunger. The percentage of people undernourished in 2006 was 6.1% and it kept decreasing gradually till it reached 4.7% in 2016. The percentage increased only twice throughout the period from 2006 to 2016, the first time was in 2012, while the second was in 2016 (In 2015, it was 4.6%). Figure 2.2 shows the number of undernourished people in Egypt in 2016 as 4.7 million before it becomes almost constant for 4 consecutive years at value of 4.5 million people. In 2012 and 2016 it increases to 4.5 million again. In 10 years, the number of people suffering from hunger remains almost unchanged. Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of children under 5 years of age who are suffering from stunted growth in Egypt. While there is no specific value recorded for the year 2006, the figure shows an increasing trend with the peak being 30.7% in 2008. The curve then goes down until it reaches 22.3% in 2014 with no further data available for the following years. In Figure 2.4, the number of stunted children appears to have been increasing even before 2006 to exceed the edge of 28 million in 2008. In 2014 the number became 26.6 million children with no tangible progress taking place overall in this regard.




**Fig 2.5:** Proportion of children moderately/severely wasted



**Fig 2.6:** Children moderately or severely wasted in thousands



**Fig 2.7:** Proportion of children moderately or severely overweight



**Fig 2.8:** Children moderately or severely overweight in thousands

Source: <https://countryprofiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-2>

In Figure 2.5 the proportion of children under 5 years of age who were wasted appears to be steadily on the rise all over the curve with the highest percentage recorded so far is 9.5% in 2014. Figure 2.6, just as the previous figure, shows an ever-increasing number of children wasted with the value in 2008 surpassing 725,000 children and in 2014 more than a million

Egyptian children. While data for many years are absent, the overall trend appears to be on the rise over the years. In Figure 2.7, the overall trend before 2008 was increasing while that post 2008 represents a gradual decrease in the proportion of overweight children in Egypt. The highest value was 20.4% while the lowest was 15.7% in 2014. In Figure 2.8, the actual number of overweight children does not seem to go down if not increases. While there is no clear number for the year 2006, but it can be estimated that the number is somewhere below the value recorded in 2008 which is around 18,658 million children. In 2014 the number recorded accounts for 18.7 million children approximately.




Fig 2.9: Plant breeds for which sufficient genetic resources




Fig 2.10: Agriculture orientation index for government expenditures




Fig 2.11: Agriculture value added as a proportion of GDP




Fig 2.12: Agriculture share of government expenditure




Fig 2.13: Total official flows received for agriculture

Source: <https://countryprofiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-2>


The overall trend in Figure 2.9 shows an increase in the number of plant breeds, an indicator for measuring biodiversity, throughout the period 2006 and 2016 and even beyond. The overall number of plant breeds was 11,654 in 2018, which is more than that in 2006, estimated to be near 8,081. Related to increasing investment in agricultural research and technology, the index above in Figure 2.10 shows a fluctuation in Egypt's performance with regard to this indicator with the value in 2006 being 0.2 decreasing in 2016 to be 0.1. The year 2012 represented the year with the highest value (1.8). According to Figure 2.11, the

percentage of agriculture as part of the overall GDP of the country was 13.2%. In 2016 this percentage went down to 11.8%. The largest decrease happened in the period between 2011 and 2012 (from 13.9% to 11.3%). It is important though to note that the curve was increasing from 2008 till 2011. In Figure 2.12, the share of agriculture in Egypt's governmental spending is fluctuating throughout the years with no specific trend whether increasing or decreasing. In 2006 it was estimated to be 2.2%. Ten years later, it became what is equivalent to 1.3%. In Figure 2.13, again there is no clear trend with the yearly values being very similar throughout the years except for a hike recorded in 2014 followed by reduction in the years that came later. In 2006 the flows were estimated to be around 124 million USD, whereas in 2016 the total disbursements increased to more than 303 million USD.


**- SDG3: Good Health and Well-Being** (*Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages*)




**Fig 3.1: Maternal mortality ratio**




**Fig 3.2: Number of infant deaths**




**Fig 3.3: Under-five mortality rate**



**Fig 3.4: Infant mortality rate**



**Fig 3.5: Under-five deaths**



**Fig 3.6: Neonatal deaths**

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-3>

Figure 3.1 shows a regular decrease in the maternal mortality ratio from 50 per 100,000 live births in 2006 to 38 per 100,000 live births in 2016. The ratio has though remained 45 per

100,000 during 3 consecutive years (2008, 2009 and 2010). The number of infant deaths in Figure 3.2 seems to be decreasing albeit slowly throughout the years with the year 2006 witnessing 53,675 infant deaths while 50,233 infant deaths were recorded for 2016. Overall, the curve appears almost horizontal from 2007 to 2012 with neither clear increases nor decreases. The rate of under-five mortality is steadily decreasing, as per Figure 3.3 with the year 2006 recording 34.4 deaths per 1,000 live births versus 22.8 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2016. Figure 3.4 provides information on Egypt's infant mortality rate in which the year 2006 witnessed 28.4 deaths per 1,000 live births opposed to 19.4 deaths in 2016. In Figure 3.5, the number of under-five deaths appears to be decreasing, except for the period between 2007 and 2012, where the curve wasn't neither going up nor down. However, the number is seen to have been decreasing before and after this interval. In 2006, the number of under-five deaths was 64,688, while in 2016 it was brought down to 58,776. As in Figure 3.6, the number of neonatal deaths in Egypt appears to have fallen from 35,388 in 2006 to 31,382 in 2016. The number, however, has stagnated from 2007 to 2011.




Fig 3.7: Neonatal mortality rate




Fig 3.8: Tuberculosis incidence



Fig 3.9: People requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases




Fig 3.10: Mortality rate attributed to cardiovascular disease and others among those from 30 to 70 years of age




Fig 3.11: Deaths attributed to cardiovascular disease




Fig 3.12: Suicide mortality rate

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-3>


In Figure 3.7, the neonatal mortality rate steadily decreases. In 2006, the number of deaths per 1,000 live births fall from 18.4 in 2006 to 12 in 2016. Overall, Figure 3.8 shows a gradual reduction in the number of Tuberculosis cases from 21 per 100,000 population in 2006 to 14 per 100,000 population in 2016. Only the number did stagnate at a level of 19 per 100,000 population from 2008 to 2009 and at a level 15 per 100,000 population from 2014 to 2015. While Figure 3.9 does not provide information about the time period targeted by this study, it appears that the number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases started to fall starting 2013 until 2016. The number, however, used to stagnate before at the value of 24 million specifically starting the year 2010 before it slightly increased in 2013. Figure 3.10 shows that the risk of dying between the ages of 30 and 70 from one of four main non-communicable diseases (cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory disease) increased from 25.3% in 2000 to 27.7% in 2016. Figure 3.11 shows an increasing trend with the number of deaths attributed to cardiovascular disease reaching a high of 245,904 in 2016. Figure 3.12 highlights the ever-increasing trend of suicide mortality in Egypt throughout the millennium. The highest recorded rate is 4 deaths per 1,000 population in 2016.




**Fig 3.13:** Deaths attributed to suicide




**Fig 3.14:** Annual alcohol consumption per capita among those 15+ years of age




**Fig 3.15:** Death rate due to road traffic injuries



**Fig 3.16:** Proportion of women of reproductive age having their need for family planning satisfied with modern methods.




**Fig 3.17:** Adolescent birth rate




**Fig 3.18:** Universal health coverage index

Source: <https://countryprofiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-3>


Figure 3.13 explains that the number of those committing suicide in Egypt is on the rise over more than a decade. In 2016, the number of deaths attributed to suicide was 3,799. While Figure 3.14 does not provide clear information regarding the years 2006 and 2016, the overall trend appears to be increasing until 2010, then the number appears to remain at the level of 0.4 litres till 2015 and beyond. According to Figure 3.15, starting 2005, the death rate due to road traffic injuries has been increasing; it reached a high of 13.5 deaths per 100,000 in 2010 before it fell to 9.7 deaths per 100,000 population in 2016, the lowest in more than a decade. In Figure 3.16, the percentage of women satisfied with modern family planning methods has increased before and after 2006 until it became 80% in 2008; this proportion hasn't changed since then. According to Figure 3.17, the rate of adolescent birth in 2006 was 50.5 per 1,000 women aged 15-19 years old; it fell to 50 in 2008 only to increase to 59 per 1,000 women in 2017. There is no recorded value though for the year 2016. Figure 3.18 shows that the index of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) service in Egypt has improved from 51 in 2005 to 68 in 2017. It is important to note that no values are recorded for 2006 nor 2016. UHC includes financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.




**Fig 3.19:** Mortality rate attributed to unintentional poisoning




**Fig 3.20:** Age-standardized prevalence of current tobacco use among persons of 15+ years of age




**Fig 3.21:** Proportion of the target population with access to DTP3



**Fig 3.22:** Proportion of the target population with access to MCV2



**Fig 3.23:** Net disbursement of total official development assistance received for medical research and basic health sectors.



**Fig 3.24:** Gross disbursement of total official development assistance received for medical research and basic health sectors.







Fig 3.25: Health worker density medical doctors

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-3>


Figure 3.19 shows the reduction of mortality rate attributed to unintentional poisoning in Egypt from 0.3 deaths in 2005 to 0.2 deaths per 100,000 population in 2016. According to Figure 3.20, the percentage of current tobacco use among persons aged 15 years and older is 21.3% in both 2005 and 2016. It can be seen that the percentage was declining until 2010 before it started rising once again. The percentage of those with access to DTP3 in Egypt, as shown in Figure 3.21, was 98% in 2006, while in 2016 the percentage was 95%, i.e., the proportion went down by 3% in 10 years-time with 2012 being the lowest point of the curve (93%). As per Figure 3.22, the percentage of the target population with access to measles vaccine second dose in Egypt declined from 97% in 2006 to 96% in 2016 with 2012 being the lowest point of the curve (92%). As in Figure 3.23, data - only available starting 2010 - reflects a net disbursement of total official development assistance received for medical research and basic health sectors of about 16.4 million USD opposed to 15.8 million USD in 2016. In Figure 3.24, the gross disbursement of total official development assistance received for medical research and basic health sectors was 46.6 million USD in 2006 opposed to 20.3 million USD in 2016. The highest point in the curve was recorded in 2007 accounting for 66.4 million USD. According to Figure 3.25, the number of medical doctors per 10,000 population has been increasing all over the period before 2014 which recorded a health worker density of 11.4 medical doctors per 10,000 population. The number started to decline significantly all the way from 2014 up to 2016 and even beyond. In 2016 the number was 8.2.




**- SDG4: Quality Education** (*Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all*)




**Fig 4.1:** Completion rate of primary education




**Fig 4.2:** Participation rate in organize learning one year before the official primary entry age



**Fig 4.3:** Participation rate in formal and non-formal education and training



**Fig 4.4:** Gender parity index for participation rate in formal and non-formal education and training




**Fig 4.5:** Adjusted rural to urban parity index for primary comple




**Fig 4.6:** Adjusted bottom to top wealth quintile parity index for primary completion rate

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-4>


The overall trend in Figure 4.1 shows an increase in the rate of primary education completion. The percentage was 85.6% in 2009 versus 90.9% in 2014. According to Figure 4.2, 18% of children in Egypt participated in pre-primary or primary education in the year prior to the official entrance age for primary school opposed to 39.7% in 2016. In Figure 4.3, The participation rate in formal and non-formal education and training increased from 0.3% in 2008 to 0.7% in 2016. It is important though to note that the from 2008 to 2014, the rate was 0.3% consecutively. Figure 4.4 shows the value of the gender parity index for participation in formal and non-formal education and training for both 2008 and 2016 was 0.4. From 2011 to 2015, the value was 0.5. The lowest value was 0.3 in 2009. The adjusted rural to urban parity index for primary completion rate increased from 0.9 in 2005 to 1 in 2014 as in Figure 4.5. While Figure 4.6 does not give us clear value for the adjusted bottom to wealth quintile index for primary completion rate for the year 2006 nor 2016, it shows an overall increasing trend with values of 0.7 and 0.9 for the years 2009 and 2014 respectively.



**Fig 4.7:** Adjusted gender parity index for primary completion



**Fig 4.8:** Proportion of primary schools with access to computers for pedagogical purposes



**Fig 4.9:** Total official flows received for scholarships

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-4>

Egypt's adjusted gender parity index for primary completion rate increased as in Figure 4.7 from 0.9 in 2005 to 1 in 2009 up to 2014. In 2010, the proportion of the Egyptian primary schools with access to computers for pedagogical purposes was 86% according to Figure 4.8, whereas in 2016, it decreased to 76%. According to Figure 4.9, Egypt's Total official flows received for scholarships increased from 1.1 million USD in 2006 to 15.4 million USD in 2016.

**- SDG5: Gender Equality (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls)**


According to Figure 5.1, the proportion of women in managerial positions in Egypt declined from 10.8% in 2006 to 7.1% in 2016. The highest percentage recorded was 14% in 2009.



**Fig 5.1:** Proportion of women in managerial positions

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-5>


**- SDG6: Clean Water and Sanitation** (*Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all*)




**Fig 6.1:** Proportion of population with basic handwashing facilities on premises




**Fig 6.2:** Proportion of population using safely managed sanitation services




**Fig 6.3:** Proportion of population practicing open defecation




**Fig 6.4:** Water use efficiency



**Fig 6.5:** Freshwater withdrawal as a proportion of available freshwater resources



**Fig 6.6:** Permanent water body extent as a proportion of total land area




**Fig 6.7:** Total gross disbursements of official development assistance received for water supply and sanitation.

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-6>


In Figure 6.1, the proportion of population with basic handwashing facilities on premises in Egypt increased from 75% in 2006 to 89.8% in 2016, i.e., 15% increase in 10 years. In Figure 6.2, the population who used a "safely managed" sanitation service--a basic facility that safely disposes of human waste increased from 55% in 2006 to 60% in 2016, i.e., a 5% increase in 10 years. In Figure 6.3, the proportion of the population who practiced open defecation in Egypt decreased from 1% in 2006 to 0% in 2014 up until 2016 and beyond. Figure 6.4 shows Egypt's water use efficiency jumped from 2.8 USD/Cubic meter in 2006 to 4.4 US dollars per cubic meter in 2016. In Figure 6.5, there is no data available for Egypt's proportion of freshwater withdrawal from available freshwater resources (i.e., level of water stress) in

2006. However, in 2010 the proportion was reaching a top of 120.7%. In 2012 it even increased to 124% before; it declined later on reaching a level of 118.7% in 2016. In Figure 6.6, Egypt's permanent water body extent was 0.7% of total land area in 2006 only to decline to 0.6% in 2016. According to Figure 6.7, the total gross disbursements of official development assistance received for water supply and sanitation increased from 128 million USD in 2006 to 266 million USD in 2016, i.e., a 138 million USD increase in 10 years (equivalent to 108%).


**- SDG7: Affordable and Clean Energy** (*Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all*)




**Fig 7.1:** Proportion of population with access to electricity




**Fig 7.2:** Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology



**Fig 7.3:** Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption



**Fig 7.4:** Energy intensity level of primary energy




**Fig 7.5:** International financial flows in support of clean energy research and development and renewable energy production

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-7>


The proportion of the population with access to electricity in Egypt increased from 99% in 2006 to 100% in 2016 as per Figure 7.1. According to Figure 7.2, 95% of the population relied primarily on clean fuels and technology in 2006 which is the same percentage for all the years to come (2016 included). Figure 7.3 shows that the share of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption of Egypt declined from 6.2% in 2006 to 5.6% in 2016. In Figure 7.4, the level of primary energy intensity in Egypt decreased from 4.2 megajoules per dollar of GDP

in 2006 to 3.6 megajoules per dollar of GDP in 2016. In Figure 7.5, the international financial flows in support of clean energy research and development and renewable energy production increased from 0.5 million dollars in 2006 to 304 million dollars in 2016. Exceptionally, the number was 996 million dollars in 2010 before and after which the curve declined.


**- SDG8: Decent Jobs and Economic Growth** (*Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all*)




**Fig 8.1:** Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita




**Fig 8.2:** Annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person




**Fig 8.3:** Proportion of informal employment



**Fig 8.4:** Unemployment rate



**Fig 8.5:** Proportion of people 15–24-year-old not in education, employment or training




**Fig 8.6:** Fatal occupational injuries among employees


Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-8>

In Figure 8.1, Egypt's annual growth rate of real GDP per capita declined from 5% in 2006 to 2% in 2016 with the lowest level being -0.4% in 2011 and the highest 5.3% in 2008. Figure 8.2 shows the annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person decreased from 2.5% in 2006 to 2.4% in 2016 with 2013 witnessing the lowest level (-0.1%) and 2015 the highest (5.8%). According to Figure 8.3, the proportion of informal employment in Egypt increased from 55.7% in 2008 to 61.9% in 2016, i.e., a 5% increase in 8 years with the year 2009 recording the lowest value (55.4%). In Figure 8.4, Egypt's unemployment rate increased


from 10.5% in 2006 to 12.4% in 2016, with the years 2008 accounting for the lowest rate (8.5%) and 2013 recording the highest one (13.2%). In Figure 8.5, the proportion of youth not in education, employment or training declined from 29.7 % in 2008 to 27.6% in 2016, i.e., a 2% decrease in 8 years with 2010 recording the highest value (33.1%). In Figure 8.6, there is no record of Egypt's fatal occupational injuries among employees for any of the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, or 2010. The only values available just before 2006 are those of 2003 which accounts for 6.5 per 100,000 employees. The highest level recorded was 13 per 100,000 employees in 2011 which later on declined to 10.7 per 100,000 employees in 2015.




**Fig 8.7:** Non-fatal occupational injuries among employees



**Fig 8.8:** Tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP




**Fig 8.9:** Number of automated teller machines



**Fig 8.10:** Number of commercial bank branches



**Fig 8.11:** Proportion of people 15 years and older with an account at a financial institution or mobile-money service provider



**Fig 8.12:** Total official flows for Aid for Trade




**Fig 8.13:** Total official commitments for Aid for Trade

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-8>

In Figure 8.7, as in the previous figure, recording starts in 2003 with no info available for the period starting 2006 up to 2010. However, the non-fatal occupational injuries among employees in Egypt appear to drop slowly from 987 per 100,000 employees in 2011 to

approximately 863 employees per 100,000 in 2015. In Figure 8.8, tourism direct GDP as a proportion of total GDP declined from 5.6% in 2009 to 4.3% in 2014 with the highest value recorded being 6.3% in 2010 and the lowest 3.9% in 2013. In Figure 8.9, the number of ATMs per 100,000 adults in Egypt increased from 4.4 in 2006 to 15.7 in 2016, i.e., a more than 3 times increase in 10 years. According to Figure 8.10, the number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults in Egypt increased from 3.9 in 2006 to 4.7 in 2016, i.e., less than one bank in 10 years. It is also important to note that the number stood at 4.6 per 100,000 adults all the years from 2009 to 2015. With no available data on the pre-2011 period, Figure 8.11 shows an increasing trend of the proportion of people 15 years and older with a bank account or mobile-money service provider from 9.7% in 2011 to 32.8% in 2017 (with data for 2016 also unavailable), a quite remarkable increase in a relatively short period of time. According to Figure 8.12, the total Aid for Trade official flows had been fluctuating throughout the years in which these disbursements were received and recorded. However, overall, the number increased from 515.2 million dollars in 2006 to 1,384 million dollars in 2018, almost a double score in 10 years. According to Figure 8.13, the total official commitments pledged by donors in Aid for Trade increased from 739.5 million USD in 2006 to 2614.3 million USD in 2016, i.e., more than a triple score in a decade. The lowest level recorded though was 480.6 million USD in 2009.


**- SDG9: Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure** (*Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation*)




**Fig 9.1:** Container port traffic, maritime transport



**Fig 9.2:** Manufacturing value added per capita




**Fig 9.3:** Manufacturing value added as a proportion of GDP



**Fig 9.4:** Manufacturing employment as a proportion of total employment




According to Figure 9.1, Egypt's container port traffic increased from 6.8 TEUs in 2010 (with no data available before that) to 7.4 TEUs in 2016. The highest value reached though was 7.9 TEUs in 2014 after which the curve tended to decline. In Figure 9.2, the manufacturing value added per capita in Egypt increased from 496 USD in 2006 to 566 USD in 2016, i.e., 14% increase in 10 years; the curve went down a little in 2011 and 2012 before it resumed growth again in 2014. According to Figure 9.3, the manufacturing value added decreased from 17% in 2006 to 16% in 2016 with the year 2012 being witnessing the lowest proportion (16.6%) in 10 this 10 years-time. In Figure 9.4, the percentage of manufacturing employment of total employment decreased from 11.7% in 2006 to 11.4% in 2016; in the same context, 2010 witnessed the biggest hike with a proportion of 12.1% whereas 2011 witnessed the biggest drop with a proportion of 9.8%.



**Fig 9.5:** Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion




**Fig 9.6:** CO2 emissions per unit of manufacturing value added




**Fig 9.7:** Research and development expenditure as a proportion of GDP




**Fig 9.8:** Researchers' density




**Fig 9.9:** Total official flows for infrastructure



**Fig 9.10:** Proportion of medium and high-tech industry value added in total value added



**Fig 9.11:** Proportion of population covered by at least a 2G mobile network




**Fig 9.12:** Proportion of population covered by at least a 3G mobile network

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-9>



In Figure 9.5, Egypt's CO2 emissions from fuel combustion increased from 152 million tonnes in 2006 to 204 million tonnes in 2016, i.e., a 34% increase in 10 years. In Figure 9.6, Egypt's CO2 emissions per unit of manufacturing value added declined from 0.9 kg in 2006 to 0.6 kg in 2016, i.e., a 0.3 kg decrease in 10 years. The highest amount recorded was approximately 1 kg in 2007. According to Figure 9.7, research and development expenditure in Egypt increased from 0.3% of GDP in 2006 to 0.7% in 2016. Egypt's researchers' density, according to Figure 9.8, increased from 631 per million inhabitants in 2007 to 689 full-time researchers per million inhabitants in 2016, i.e., a 9% increase in 9 years. In Figure 9.9, Egypt's total official flows received for infrastructure increased from 381 million USD in 2006 to 2,931 million USD in 2016, i.e., a 669% increase in 10 years. In Figure 9.10, the share of medium and high-tech industry in total value added declined from 25.8% in 2006 to 18.4% in 2016 with 2014 witnessing the lowest share of 14%. According to Figure 9.11, 99.8 % of the population in Egypt were covered by at least a 2G mobile network in 2016 opposed to 92% in 2006. According to Figure 9.12, 98.7 % of the population in Egypt were covered by at least a 3G mobile network in 2016 opposed to 77% in 2009 (21% increase in 7 years).


**- SDG10: Reduced Inequalities** (*Reduce inequality within and among countries*)




**Fig 10.1:** Proportion of people living below 50% of median income




**Fig 10.2:** Labor share of GDP



**Fig 10.3:** Proportion of tariff lines applied to imports with zero-tariff



**Fig 10.4:** Total assistance for development



**Fig 10.5:** Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted

In 2008, 5% of the population were living below half of the median income; the same percentage continued in 2015 and 2016 (See Figure 10.1). Figure 10.2 shows that the labor share of GDP in Egypt has increased from 34.4% in 2006 to 34.6% in 2016. Lowest share recorded was 32.4% in 2009 while the highest was 36.7% in 2014. According to Figure 10.3, the proportion of tariff lines applied to imports with zero-tariff was 66.2% in 2016 versus in 67.3% in 2010 (with no data available for 2006). In Figure 10.4, the total amount received in assistance for development in Egypt increased from 5400.7 million USD in 2006 to 9516.4 million USD in 2016 (i.e., 76% increase in 10 years). The largest amount ever was 17273 million USD in 2008 while the smallest was 4102.8 million USD in 2011. According to Figure 10.5, remittance costs were 4.2% of the amount remitted in 2011 opposed to 5.7% in 2015. No further data on the pre-2011 period nor the year 2016 is available.

**- SDG11: Sustainable Cities and Communities** (*Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable*)

According to Figure 11.1, the proportion of the urban population living in slums declined from 17.1% in 2005 (no data available for 2006) to 6.6% in 2016, i.e., a more than 10% decrease in 11 years.




Figure 11.1: Proportion of urban population living in slums  
Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-11>

**- SDG12: Responsible Consumption and Production** (*Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns*)




Fig 12.1: Total domestic material consumption per unit of GDP




Fig 12.2: Total domestic material consumption per capita




**Fig 12.3:** Electronic waste generated per capita


**Source:** <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-12>

In Figure 12.1, the material footprint (amount of primary material used) stood at 2.9 kg per unit of GDP in 2016 versus 3.1 kg in 2006. Highest amount was 3.2 kg in 2008 while the lowest was 2.8 kg in 2011. In Figure 12.2, Egypt's domestic material consumption increased from 6.8 metric tons per capita in 2006 to 7.6 metric tons per capita in 2016. Highest value was 7.8 metric tons per capita in 2009. In Figure 12.3, Egypt's electronic waste generated per capita increased from 3 kg in 2006 to 5.6 kg in 2016, i.e., an 86.7% increase in 10 years.


**- SDG13: Climate Action** (*Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*)



**Fig 13.1:** People affected by disaster



**Fig 13.2:** Deaths due to disaster



**Fig 13.3:** Deaths and missing persons attributed to disasters (rate)


**Source:** <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-13>

According to Figure 13.1, the number of people affected by disasters in Egypt decreased from 25,824 in 2006 to 22,572 in 2016. The largest number was 37,284 in 2010 while the smallest was 20,328 in 2015. In Figure 13.2, the number of deaths due to disasters in Egypt significantly fell from 6,291 in 2006 to 2,246 in 2016, i.e., a decrease by 64.3% in 10 years. On a related note, 2009 was reported to have witnessed the highest number of deaths due to

disasters reaching 7,822. In Figure 13.3, there were 8.6 deaths and missing persons attributed to disasters per 100,000 population in 2006 compared to 2.4 in 2016.


**- SDG14: Life Below Water** (*Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development*)

According to Figure 14.1, the average proportion of Marine Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs) covered by protected areas in Egypt increased from 40% in 2006 to 43% in 2016.




**Fig 14.1:** Average proportion of Marine KBAs covered by protected areas  
Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-14>


**- SDG15: Life on Land** (*Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss*)




**Fig 15.1:** Forest area as a proportion of total land area




**Fig 15.2:** Average proportion of Terrestrial KBAs covered by protected areas




**Fig 15.3:** Forest area annual net change rate



**Fig 15.4:** Red List Index



**Fig 15.5:** Total reported number of SMTAs transferring plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to the country



**Fig 15.6:** Total official development assistance for biodiversity

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-15>


According to Figure 15.1, the percentage of forest area of total land area in Egypt declined from 0.1% in 2010 to 0.05% in 2016. According to Figure 15.2, the percentage of

Terrestrial Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs) covered by protected areas in Egypt has increased from 39% in 2006 to 39.4% in 2016. According to Figure 15.3, Egypt's forest area annual net change rate declined from 1.04% in 2010 to -5.9% in 2015. Figure 15.4 shows Egypt's position on the Red List Index concerned with degradation of natural habitats and loss of biodiversity in which the higher the rank, the more dangerous the environmental/ecological situation with regards to threatened species. In 2006, Egypt's score was 0.95 which slightly decreased to 0.92 in 2016. Figure 15.5 shows that the total reported number of Standard Material Transfer Agreements (SMTAs) transferring plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to Egypt in 2012 was 961 versus 1,629 in 2016. Figure 15.6 shows a severe fluctuation in the total amount of official development assistance received by Egypt for biodiversity. While Egypt received in 2006 a relatively large amount of aid estimated as 64 million USD, it ended up receiving only 10.5 million USD a decade later. In 2015, Egypt received only 0.4 million USD in aid, the lowest amount ever reported.

**- SDG16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions** (*Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels*)



**Fig 16.1:** Number of detected victims of human trafficking




**Fig 16.2:** Unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population

Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-16>


According to the available data in Figure 16.1, the number of detected victims of human trafficking per 100,000 population in Egypt increased from 4 in 2009 to 81 in 2016. The largest number reported was 116 in 2014. Figure 16.2 shows a decreasing trend in the percentage of

unsentenced detainees of overall prisoners in Egypt. The only two values we have is 13.7% for 2005 and that for 2015 estimated as 9.8%.


**- SDG17: Partnerships for the Goals** (*Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development*)




**Fig 17.1:** Total government revenue as a proportion of GDP




**Fig 17.2:** Domestic budget funded by domestic taxes as a proportion of GDP




**Fig 17.3:** FDI inflows



**Fig 17.4:** Remittances as a proportion of total GDP



**Fig 17.5:** Debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services




**Fig 17.6:** Fixed internet broadband subscriptions


Source: <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-17>

Figure 17.1 shows that Egypt's total governmental revenue percentage of its GDP decreased from 27% in 2006 to 22% in 2015 - a clear decline in the functions performed by the state and their quality. Figure 17.2 shows that relative to GDP, Egypt's domestic budget funded by domestic taxes declined from 44.5% in 2006 to 38.2% in 2015. The highest percentage reported was 47.8% in 2007 while the lowest was 34.5% in 2014. Figure 17.3 shows that Egypt's foreign direct investment inflows decreased from 10,043 million USD in 2006 to 8,107 million USD in 2016. The largest amount reported was 11,578 million USD in 2007 while the biggest drop was -483 million USD in 2011. Figure 17.4 shows that the inflow of personal remittances was 5% of GDP in 2006 compared to 5.6% in 2016. The lowest inflow was 3.8% in 2009 while the highest was in 6.9% in 2012. Figure 17.5 shows that debt service as a


proportion of exports of goods and services increased from 6% in 2006 to 18% in 2016, i.e., a threefold increase in 10 years. Figure 17.6 shows that fixed-broadband internet penetration in Egypt increased from 0.34 per 100 inhabitants in 2006 to 4.73 per 100 inhabitants in 2016.




**Fig 17.7:** Internet users



**Fig 17.8:** Total official development assistance for technical cooperation



**Fig 17.9:** Worldwide weighted tariff-average



**Fig 17.10:** Worldwide weighted tariff-average, preferential status

**Source:** <https://country-profiles.unstatshub.org/egy#goal-17>

Figure 17.7 shows that the number of internet users in Egypt increased from 13.7 per 100 inhabitants in 2006 to 41.2 per 100 inhabitants in 2016. Figure 17.8 shows the total gross disbursement of official development assistance for technical cooperation in Egypt increased from 354.5 million USD in 2006 to 1,235 million USD in 2016, i.e., a more than 3 times increase in 10 years, with 2013 reporting the lowest amount of 183 million USD. Figure 17.9 shows that the worldwide weighted tariff average for countries with most-favored nation status declined from 11.4 % in 2010 to 9.1% in 2016. Figure 17.10, similarly with the previous one, shows that the worldwide weighted tariff-average for countries with preferential status declined from 10.6% in 2010 to 7.1% in 2016.

## 2. Fragility Indicators




Figure 18.1: Egypt's Overall Fragility Trend




Figure 18.2: Egypt's Yearly Fragility Change

2016	38th	90.2
2015	38th	89.9
2014	31st	91.0
2013	34th	90.6
2012	31st	90.4
2011	45th	86.8
2010	49th	87.6
2009	43rd	89.0
2008	40th	88.7
2007	36th	89.2
2006	31st	89.5

Figure 18.3: Egypt's Fragility Ranks and Scores

Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

In Figure 124, Egypt's fragility trend appears to be decreasing (i.e., improving) from 2006 to 2011 before the curve tends to sharply rise in 2012. 2014 represents a record high in Egypt's overall trend. The curve falls a little bit to stand at the above 90 level in 2016, which is higher than the under-90 initial point of 2006. It is important to note here that scoring from 60-90 reflects warning while (90–120) indicates alert. The less the score, the more stable/sustainable a country is. According to Figure 125, Egypt's performance was improving during all the pre-2011 years except for 2009. Starting 2012, Egypt's position started to worsen for 3 years consecutively; until it improved in 2015 before it slightly reverted back in 2016. According to Figure 126, Egypt's rank has improved from 31<sup>st</sup> position in 2006 to 38<sup>th</sup> in 2016 (the more a country's rank lags behind, the better). In the same regard, it is important to note that 2014 is the year that reflected the highest score (91 of 120) indicating more fragility in terms of the overall sum of the sub indicators' points. On the other edge of the spectrum, while still in the warning category, 2011 relatively represented the best ranking for Egypt.



### A- Cohesion Indicators




Figure 19.1: Security Apparatu





Figure 19.2: Factionalized Elites



Figure 19.3: Group Grievances

Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

The Security Apparatus indicator deals with the monopoly on the use of force, relationship between security and citizenry, alongside force and arms. In Figure 127, Egypt's score in 2006 was 6.5 points improving to around 6 in 2007 and 2008. The year 2009 reflected a steady deterioration as the curve sharply rose until it reached a record high of more than 8 points, specifically in mid-2016. "Factionalized Elites" is the 2<sup>nd</sup> of the cohesion indicators that is concerned with measuring representative leadership, identity, resource distribution, and equality and equity. Figure 128 shows an increase in Egypt's score (i.e., more fragility) from 2006 to mid-2008 before the curve goes down up to mid-2011. Starting the second half of 2011, Egypt's score rose sharply to stand at an alarming high quite less than 9 points in 2016. The 3<sup>rd</sup> of cohesion indicators, "Group Grievances" measures post conflict response, equality, divisions, and communal violence. In Figure 128, Egypt's score in 2006 decreased from 8.5 to less than 8 points in mid-2008 (i.e., less fragility). From 2008 to mid-2012 it increased again (i.e., fragility persists). The score relatively fell in 2013 before it alarmingly rose again surpassing the level of 9 points in 2016. The overall trend appears to be heading to the worse during the decade (2006-2016).

**B- Political Indicators****Figure 20.1:** State Legitimacy**Figure 20.2:** Public Services**Figure 20.3:** Human Rights & Rule of Law

Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/country-data/>

State Legitimacy represents the first of political indicators which measures confidence in the political process, political opposition, transparency, openness and fairness of the political process in addition to political violence. In Figure 129, Egypt's score decreases (i.e., less fragility) from 9 in 2006 to 8.4 points 2010 before it sharply rose in 2011 and 2012 reaching 9.2. It went up a little bit from 2013 to 2014 reaching 9 points before it went down in 2016 to a lower level than its initial in 2006 (8.4 points approximately versus 9 in 2006), i.e., a rather slight improvement during 10 years. The Public Services indicator is the 2<sup>nd</sup> of political indicators that measures the general provision of public services, health, education, shelter, and infrastructure. In Figure 130, Egypt's score has been declining since 2006 all the way to 2016 (i.e., indicating less fragility). It is important to note here that this is the only sub-indicator of the previous Cohesion and Political ones that reflects a remarkable improvement in Egypt's fragility scores, which is compatible with Egypt's overall performance across the SDGs as explained earlier. The Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator is the 3<sup>rd</sup> and last of the political indicators used to assess Egypt's overall fragility trend; it measures civil and political rights, violation of rights, openness, justice and equality. In Figure 131, Egypt's score started at 8 in 2006 only to increase to more than 9.5 points in 2016. (i.e., the trend is overall towards more fragility in this regard). From 2011 to 2013, the score hiked surpassing the 9.5 limit. From 2013 to 2015 it increased again before it stood at the alarming level of 9.5 in 2016. The previous

indicators show that Egypt's overall fragility trend starting 2006 to 2016 has minimally improved; the country appears to still have not overcome its chronic structural weakness despite some advancements in pursuing the SDGs. Overall, despite this minimal improvement on the fragility indicator throughout this 10-year period, Egypt's is still classified as fragile whose rank persistently qualifies it to be in the warning/alert category. Of the 6 sub-indicators analyzed, it is the only the Public Services indicator that reflected a real progress throughout the period aforementioned. This is consistent to a great extent with Egypt's trends across the 123 SDG indicators of which many showed positive results and advancements, especially in social aspects, taking into account the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis, and post 2011 political turmoil, economic slowdown and increasing security and demographic challenges. While progress on public services is surely needed and at heart of the concept of fragility, the political component of the process which deals with state-society relations and maintaining good governance remains greatly unaddressed if not neglected. This is also compatible with Egypt's reporting on SDG16, the only goal relevant to political institutions and democratic governance which suffers from lack of transparency (El-Baradei, 2020).

#### Research Limitations

Data availability is a major concern since some indicators are either not up to date or provide data that do not cover the time period specified in the research objective. There is, also, a disparity between the development indicators used at the local level and those used internationally, even though they happen to measure the same goal. Furthermore, coming to an accurate quantitative measurement of the magnitude of state fragility is risky and methodologically challenging, not to mention the difficulty of isolating intervening variables.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

Despite relative enhancements pertaining various social services in Egypt throughout the period (2006-2016), as per the various sustainable development indicators and literature checked, the country is still far away from stable or sustainable, in terms of its overall fragility status according to the Fragile States Index. Although it is true that provision of public services, managing socioeconomic affairs and ameliorating state infrastructure are all valid developmental duties that often entail much focus, institutional effort, administrative capacity, resource allocation and managerial pressure from the bureaucracy side – especially in a developing context, it is necessary to pay attention to the overall leading political mechanisms that govern all these practices and processes. Perceiving fragility as governance-related malfunction and, therefore, taking concrete steps toward political openness, accountability, and launching partnership with civil society would not only help improve Egypt's position on fragility indices but also create a more active and dynamic environment for sustainable development initiatives where citizens play an indispensable part in policymaking and determining the country's public needs and priorities from their own perspective, which promotes for more societal participation and engagement in governmental decision making. The following set of recommendations may assist in bridging the gap in Egypt's state-society relations and enhancing participatory governance:

**1-** While the role of the parliament is by default to act as a hub for exchanging views over legislations, this is not usually the case in non-democratic settings. Therefore, there is a need for establishing specialized governmental task forces that act as advisory tanks bringing stakeholders together in different fields. For example, a health-care specialized group whose mission is to conduct continuous meetings with doctors and medical staffs for the sake of agenda setting, monitoring, and feedback, especially in times of crises, not to mention COVID-19, another group for communicating with teacher syndicate on education-related issues, a third

for communicating with journalists on the future of media framework, a fourth to communicate with businessmen and entrepreneurs on investment-related issues and market regulations and so forth. Connecting with civil society foundations in this context is of a paramount importance for designing more grounded policy interventions and allowing for various viewpoints to be represented.

**2-** Holding the municipal elections at the earliest convenience to ensure social needs at the grassroots levels are being tackled, or at least discussed with elected representatives for that shall provide a useful channel for bottom-up communication.

**3-** Capitalizing on the consultations that preceded the drafting of Egypt's Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS), known as Egypt Vision 2030 in 2015, calling for another round of public dialogue on the importance of the gradual introduction of a socially agreed upon political reform dimension to the SDS document is critically needed.

**4-** Localizing the SDGs in a way that would allow every ministry, sector and governorate to have its own blueprint to implement in light of its resources and capabilities and to and for which it is to be accountable and publicly responsible.

**5-** Enhancing data collection, surveying and scanning mechanisms, especially at the local level to ensure more reliable reporting on the progress regarding the SDGs through introducing new models that innovatively combine methods of statistics, sociology and anthropology.

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